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In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the American 
constitutional system was shaken by a series of controversies arising out of the aggressive 
response of the Bush administration.  Prominent among these were furious and deeply felt 
disputes over the use of torture in interrogation, the treatment of detainees, especially at 
Guantanamo Bay, and domestic surveillance.  The Bush administration came under heavy 
criticism not only for actions initially taken in secret and unauthorized by Congress, but for the 
way it led the nation into the authorized war against Iraq in 2003.  Many Americans believed that 
the war had been foisted on the public in a deceptive way without adequate consideration of its 
costs.  As a result of these controversies, President George W. Bush was only the latest in a long 
line of chief executives accused of acting as an “imperial” president. 
The advent of the Obama administration did not lead to a stilling of the waters.  To an 
extent surprising to his supporters, President Barack Obama did not break decisively with all of 
the controversial policies of the Bush administration.
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  This suggested a factor common to these 
administrations was at work.  The controversies that plagued the Bush administration and the 
unwillingness of the Obama administration to change those policies were the latest examples of a 
long chain of constitutional difficulties connected with the unilateral exercise of presidential 
power in foreign affairs and, more specifically, the use of presidential power to wage war. 
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Controversies over the use of executive power have existed throughout American history. 
But they took on a completely new dimension following the enormous expansion in the 
capacities of government necessary to prevail in World War II and the Cold War.  Seen in this 
light, the deeply problematic aspects of the Bush administration’s “war on terror” belong to a 
family of constitutional crises that include Watergate in the Nixon administration and the Iran-
contra affair in the Reagan administration.  These crises are part of a pattern of recurrent policy 
disasters and constitutional problems linked to the war power that run back to the Truman 
administration and include both covert and overt military operations such as the Bay of Pigs and 
the Vietnam War. 
Scholars have had difficulty analyzing this recurrent pattern, in part because of the 
influence of persuasive, yet misleading narratives such as the “imperial presidency.”  While 
presidents have not been blameless in their exercise of power in foreign affairs, neither have they 
been alone in making decisions or operating entirely outside the Constitution.  Criticizing 
presidents as individuals gone haywire ignores that they have had significant, even sometimes 
overwhelming, political support for actions that from a constitutional point of view are quite 
dubious.  It further ignores that they have plausibly seen themselves as chiefly responsible for 
advancing the foreign policy and protecting the national security of the United States.
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Americans like to think of their constitutional system as stable and resistant to formal 
change through amendment.  Somewhat paradoxically, they also believe in the “living 
Constitution,” a document that has adapted successfully to changing circumstances.  The 
clashing character of these beliefs has been especially evident in the debate over the use of 
executive power in foreign affairs.  “Presidentialists” argue that increased executive power after 
World War II was a reasonable alteration of the constitutional system in light of the new global 
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responsibilities and hegemonic status of the U.S.  “Congressionalist” opponents of this 
perspective cite the original eighteenth-century constitutional arrangements as their touchstone in 
defending the traditional powers of Congress.  Common to both positions is the assumption that 
regardless of the degree of practical changes in the responsibilities of government, the 
Constitution was adequate to the challenge of the post-World War II era.   
We can make better progress if we reject this assumption.  This is an unfamiliar path for 
analysis, but one better able to cope with the complex relationship between the reality of changed 
circumstances and a relatively fixed text and set of traditions.  Since the United States assumed a 
position of global leadership and responsibility after World War II, serious tensions have plagued 
our constitutional system.  They are connected by the near-total reliance on executive power to 
defend national security. 
Relative to the popular yet opposed narratives of the imperial presidency and executive 
triumphalism offered by congressionalists and presidentialists respectively, the argument I 
develop in this book is complex and cuts across the standard lines of the war powers debate.  
With presidentialists, I agree that the new global responsibilities of the United States necessitated 
a significant alteration to the constitutional order.  Against presidentialists, I contend that the 
transition was anything but a smooth adaptation and was the source of severe and ongoing 
problems, not only within the constitutional order, but with respect to policymaking in foreign 
affairs and national security.  With congressionalists, I agree that post-1945 presidents have 
acted against the eighteenth-century meaning of the Constitution and sometimes abused their 
power.  Against congressionalists, I contend that the historical meaning of the war-making 
provisions of the Constitution could not be implemented in the post-1945 context, at least not 
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without a formal overhaul of the separation of powers, especially of the structure of Congress, to 
a degree that has never been contemplated. 
So my purpose in this book is not so much to contribute to the still-ongoing war powers 
debate as it is to reconceive it and change our perspective on what it should be about.  Put 
another way, I offer a novel internal critique of the presidentialist position rather than 
adjudicating every point at issue in the debate.  Presidentialists argue that executive leadership in 
foreign affairs is not only good policy, but is justified by the text and eighteenth-century history 
of the Constitution, as well as by subsequent practice.  While I accept this position in its broad 
outlines, I insist on a key reservation.  War is different.  It is marked as such not only by legal 
authorities that all parties acknowledge as relevant to the war powers controversy, but by the 
actual practice of American diplomacy.  While historical practice is a source of evidence that 
presidentialists have claimed for their own, it in fact supports the vital qualification that among 
the tools of diplomacy and national security strategy, war is special.  The original constitutional 
order, preserved in key respects through the decades until the advent of the Cold War, makes 
approval by Congress obligatory before the nation goes to war.  This order encouraged 
interbranch deliberation by requiring presidents to run the risk that their proposals for war would 
be rejected.  In the post-1945 period, the unthinking extension of the position that the executive 
must lead in foreign affairs to the very different situation presented by decisions for war has 
destabilized the constitutional system and deranged policymaking. 
In understanding the differences between the Cold War and previous periods of military 
conflict, we must consider all three dimensions of executive war making that were prominent 
after 1945.  The Cold War featured new ways of war making in addition to conventional war.  
For example, covert wars involved paramilitary forces recruited from other countries.  These 
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forces were capable of mounting significant military operations, whether considered technically 
“covert” or not.  Likewise, we should not overlook nuclear weapons.  The presence of such 
destructive weapons strongly influenced military doctrine for fighting conventional wars.  
Perhaps more important, all presidents in the post-World War II period were required to come to 
grips with their responsibility for ordering U.S. forces to launch a strike that might kill hundreds 
of millions of people and render large areas of the globe uninhabitable. 
One main theme of this book is that the Constitution can influence policy even when it is 
not enforced by the courts.  War powers are an especially timely and relevant example of this 
phenomenon, which is still too little acknowledged by lawyers and legal academics.  The 
Constitution could not constrain or empower government until it was implemented within an 
institutional structure which I call a “constitutional order.”  A succession of constitutional orders 
has enabled government to function effectively in the United States from the eighteenth century 
onward.  War powers, however, have had a unique history.  The Constitution was written to 
reflect the premise that the nation could go to war only through the meaningful deliberation and 
consent of the legislative and executive branches of government.  A war undertaken solely by 
one branch would thus risk policy catastrophe.  This is what has occurred all too frequently since 
1945. 
Critics of the imperial presidency have worried about the loss of civil liberties that has 
followed from the expansion of presidential power.  Although I do not wish to minimize the 
violations of constitutional rights that did occur in the Cold War and after, our chief concern 
should be the consequences of overthrowing the policymaking process for war established by the 
Constitution.  In particular, what I call the “cycle of accountability” that turns between the 
executive and legislative branches has not properly operated with respect to foreign affairs after 
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1945.  The cycle is a handy way of capturing what occurs when ordinary interbranch interaction 
is extended over time.  Once a cycle is created, each branch knows that its decisions will be 
reviewed by the other.  A pattern of mutual testing and deliberation results.  Having a cycle of 
accountability means there is the potential to learn from mistakes.  The cycle is an ongoing 
institutional practice in which both branches are held accountable. 
Why is the post-1945 context so powerfully relevant for us today?   Many commentators 
have seen the new-style conflict that followed 9/11 as a “long war.”4  Surprisingly, the most 
outstanding example of a “long war” – the Cold War fought against the Soviet Union and its 
communist allies – has been relatively neglected in the vast commentary that surrounds 9/11.  
Indeed, one of the striking characteristics of post-9/11 America has been the failure to engage 
with the Cold War as a way of understanding how presidential power in foreign affairs is 
exercised in the context of a lengthy indeterminate struggle.  This is both odd and telling. 
No one doubts that the origins of the contemporary constitutional order in foreign affairs 
and defense policy, sometimes called the “national security state,” lie in the Cold War.  Yet we 
have not been overwhelmed with comparisons to the Cold War since 9/11.  The pattern among 
legal scholars has been to search for analogies to the “war on terror” in Lincoln’s leadership in 
the Civil War or Roosevelt’s decisions during World War II.5  While it is important to 
understand the constitutional order in which Roosevelt operated, especially prior to Pearl Harbor, 
that order underwent a major transformation after 1945.  The post-1945 constitutional order with 
respect to national security established by President Truman at the beginning of the Cold War 
and the all-encompassing struggle against the perceived threat of communism form the most 
important baseline for understanding our post-9/11 constitutional and governmental reality. 
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The constitutional order prior to Pearl Harbor did not have to cope with a strategy in 
foreign affairs that assumed American responsibility for global security, accompanying global 
military commitments, U.S. troops permanently stationed in foreign countries, intelligence 
agencies engaged in covert action, or nuclear weapons.  Whereas prior to Pearl Harbor the U.S. 
was certainly engaged in world affairs as a naval power, it also adhered to a sharp distinction 
between war and peace and declarations or authorizations of war as integral elements of 
diplomacy.  The Cold War constitutional order involved apprehension of an existential threat, a 
perceived danger from an appealing global ideology that mandated increased internal security, 
assertions that we had to stand ready to violate long-held values and beliefs, and enforced 
acceptance that we were in totally unique circumstances, never before seen in American history, 
involving an indefinite war against an implacable foreign enemy.  If these elements seem 
familiar, as of course they should, I hope you will join me in wondering why scholars have not 
been probing the Cold War more assiduously for clues about the sources of our post-9/11 
difficulties in foreign policy.
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While war powers are central to my argument, this book is more of an analytical history 
of presidential decisionmaking than a legal treatise and, apart from parts of chapters 1 and 2, is 
not structured as a contribution to the war powers debate.  As I stated earlier, I am not so much 
trying to contribute to the standard debate as I am attempting to reconceive it and change 
commonly accepted ideas of what the debate is about.  In my view, the debate must be firmly 
grounded in an understanding of U.S. foreign policy and, at the same time, the special issues 
posed when the U.S. actually engages in a major war.  Many people believe, for example, that 
important questions are at stake every single time the president orders the use of any sort of 
military force.  By contrast, I closely analyze presidential decisionmaking concerning major wars 
8 
 
and covert paramilitary actions in the context of U.S. foreign policy.  While this presents some 
issues of definition, there is wide agreement on the most significant wars the U.S. has fought 
since 1945 – Korea, Vietnam, the 1991 Gulf War, Afghanistan and Iraq.  Although I also discuss 
major covert actions involving the threat of war, such as those against Cuba and Nicaragua, and 
the deployment of nuclear weapons, these major military conflicts just noted are my central 
concern.
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  The first two wars caused most of the casualties suffered by our armed forces since 
1945 and have been solemnized with memorials on the Mall, one of our nation’s most honored 
spaces.  Such wars past and present deserve our special concern, respect and attention. 
Nevertheless, the fact that I cross the path of the war powers debate demands some 
further comment.  The standard debate has been ongoing at least since the Vietnam War became 
controversial in the mid-1960s.  Yet the controversy is unusual in some respects.  Consider that 
there is no scholarship on the history of the war powers debate as such.  Was Vietnam in fact the 
origin of the debate and its vast and intricate web of argumentation?  Consider also that there is 
no scholarly history of key elements of the debate such as the 1973 War Powers Resolution.  It is 
as if the debate has always been with us, beyond history.  Indeed, it is widely believed that the 
controversy flows from a power struggle between the executive and legislative branches that 
began in the early republic.  One of my key findings is that this sense of a timeless controversy is 
an artifact of the Cold War itself, something largely promoted by presidentialists.  The war 
powers debate did not exist in its contemporary form, including the broad claims made by post-
1945 presidents, until the advent of the Cold War in the Truman administration.  This is a strong 
claim, yet one amply supported by a detailed consideration of diplomatic history. 
In order to demonstrate this contention and promote clarity with respect to a debate many 
legal scholars regard as a stalemate, I have gone to some lengths to situate the debate in the Cold 
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War.  This naturally suggests a focus on the distinctive assertions of power that presidents made 
in this period.  Over time, however, the academic debate has focused more on the claims of 
scholars than of presidents.  While this is not entirely surprising, what is startling is how badly 
many prominent scholars have misunderstood the maximal character of those presidential claims.  
In turn, because of this misunderstanding, the clarity with which the evidence from the founding 
period speaks to the contemporary war powers debate has not been appreciated fully.  Beginning 
with Truman, nearly all post-1945 presidents have claimed the unilateral power under Article II 
to initiate war, “real” war, full-scale war.  The underappreciated crux of the war powers debate is 
that while this bold presidential claim is inconsistent with the historical meaning of the 
Constitution, it has an eminently defensible policy rationale. 
While I am not sympathetic to this unilateral presidential claim, the standard 
congressionalist critique is simply too narrow.  Considered from the perspective of the executive 
branch, this claim does not appear extraordinary because it is encapsulated in a larger 
perspective, which many have found persuasive, in which military force is one tool among others 
in advancing the foreign policy and preserving the national security of the United States.  By 
concentrating on whether every presidential military action is specifically authorized, the 
congressionalist critique has missed the real problem – the absence of interbranch deliberation 
over time on matters of foreign policy and national security strategy – that is, the lack of a cycle 
of accountability. 
By contending that presidential war powers claims should be understood within the 
framework of American diplomacy, I urge a bit more sympathy for presidents than 
congressionalists have managed to display in the war powers debate.  The presidentialist position 
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cannot be understood and evaluated appropriately unless we have a firm grasp on the situation 
the executive branch faced at the beginning of the Cold War. 
In order to carry out this contextual task, we must expand the frame of the war powers 
debate, considering insights that constitutional scholars have generally bypassed from primary 
and secondary sources relating to diplomatic history and presidential decision making in foreign 
policy.  This book is thus based primarily on a comprehensive survey of the diplomatic and 
presidential history of the post-World War II period.  Inevitably, my sources will not satisfy 
some historians who expect familiarity with the latest specialized studies.  However, my 
argument is based on a more thorough assessment of the relevant historical literature, along with 
some key collections of primary sources, than any previous work on war powers with respect to 
this critical period of American history. 
 
 
 The plan of the book is as follows.  Chapters 1 and 2 create the framework that guides the 
discussion in the rest of the book.  Chapter 1 introduces the concept of a constitutional order and 
describes the order of the early republic with respect to war and foreign affairs.  Chapters 1 and 2 
contrast this pre-Pearl Harbor constitutional order with the post-1945 constitutional order 
founded by President Truman, his advisers, key members of Congress and the foreign policy 
elite in the early Cold War.  Chapters 1 and 2 also establish the historical context necessary to 
evaluate the arguments in the standard war powers debate.  Chapter 2 shows how Truman 
created the presidential power to initiate war, a key element of the post-1945 constitutional order, 
when he made the decision in 1950 to intervene in Korea.  It concludes by summarizing the 
elements of the post-1945 constitutional order. 
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The next four chapters provide an extended analysis of the problems and tensions 
encountered as policymakers attempted to work within the inherently flawed structure of the 
post-1945 constitutional order amid three different arenas for war making: conventional, covert, 
and nuclear.  Chapter 3 discusses the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and describes 
Eisenhower’s way of war and the increasing use of covert war in both administrations, 
culminating in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.  Chapter 4 describes the crisis of the post-1945 
constitutional order in the Johnson and Nixon administrations, linking the Vietnam War with 
Watergate. 
After Vietnam there was a break in the continuity of the Cold War in that the political 
parties took different paths with respect to war and foreign affairs.  While Democrats 
increasingly doubted the verities of the Cold War, an attitude reflected in their support of 
Nixon’s policy of détente with the Soviet Union, Republicans bypassed the trauma of Vietnam in 
favor of renewing a commitment to the Cold War.  Chapter 5 thus begins with an analysis of 
where matters stood after Vietnam and follows the path of the Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush I 
administrations as they attempted to cope with a post-Vietnam environment in which the post-
1945 constitutional order was nonetheless still dominant.  Chapter 6 carries the post-Vietnam 
discussion through the Clinton and Bush II administrations, especially in light of the challenges 
posed by 9/11.  Throughout these chapters I focus on demonstrating the recurrent pattern of 
policy dysfunction and constitutional crisis caused by the friction between the original 
constitutional order and the post-1945 order. 
 In chapter 7 I examine whether it would be possible to build a new constitutional order to 
deal with the problems caused by the jerry-built structure of the post-1945 order.  I do this in two 
main stages.  I first summarize how to reconceive the war powers debate by reviewing what the 
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debate should be about.  After commenting on how the Obama administration fits into the post-
1945 constitutional order, I then move to a consideration of how altering the structure of 
Congress is a necessary precondition for addressing our war powers troubles. 
In all candor I should say that proposing solutions is secondary to this book’s purpose.  
Why is this justifiable?  While I like proposing solutions as much as the next legal academic, it 
bears emphasis that the solutions offered in faculty lounges tend to assume a judicial deus ex 
machina that is not available for war powers.  The most important task with respect to war 
powers is simply to understand the position we are in.  Thus my primary purpose is not to 
propose solutions to our war powers difficulties but rather to change our perspective on both 
where the problem lies and how to move forward. 
Ultimately, I aim to provide the missing connections between the exercise of presidential 
power in foreign affairs and a continuing series of policy disasters and constitutional crises.  This 
book connects the dots with respect to the Constitution and national security and explains a 
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